

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XX. No. 6.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 10, 1811.

[Price 1s.

"Let him who fairly wins receive the prize."—DRYDEN.

[161]

[162]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS (*continued from page 144*).—At the page, here referred to, I brought down the history of these wars to the raising of the siege of Badajoz. I shall now continue it to the date of the dispatches last published, and, as the reader will perceive from the following document, I have now an additional motive to execute this task of historian with zeal and fidelity. "EXTRAORDINARY PROGRAM.—The whole Nation and all Europe being sensible of the immortal services which Marshal General Lord Viscount Wellington, and his illustrious companions in arms, have done, and are doing, to the Prince Regent, our Sovereign, to our country, and to the whole human race, promising ourselves, from the glorious victories achieved by them, by Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, and by the other Generals of the Allied Armies, the most fortunate result of the obstinate conflict in which we are engaged with the common enemy; it is the duty of every Portuguese to join according to his ability, in perpetuating the memory of such signal exploits, not only in testimony of the gratitude of a people towards their benefactor, but to the end that our posterity may receive in the heroic actions of this great General, and the gallant warriors who triumphed under his command, glorious examples of the most undaunted valour, military skill, coolness, prudence, humanity, and steadiness in defending the rights of the allied Sovereigns. From all these considerations, the above-mentioned highly-deserving Portuguese promises the reward of a *gold medal*, of the value of 50,000 reals, to the Author of a Treatise upon the subject proposed, under the following title:—"MEMOIRS FOR A HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF MARSHAL GENERAL LORD VISC. WELLINGTON, IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1811." This reward shall be adjudged to the writer, who, in the opinion of the Academy, has done the most justice to the subject.

"—The terms of the program are, that the Memoirs be written in *Portuguese*, *English*, or *French*; that they be transmitted to the Secretary of the Academy, at the end of May 1812, to be judged according to the established regulations. And that the names of the authors be contained in sealed papers, having the same device with the Memoirs, to be opened only in the event of being successful. — JOHN WILLIAM CHRISTIAN MILLER, Secretary to the Academy.— *Secretary's Office, June 12, 1811.*"— Fifty thousand reals do not, I believe, amount to more than about 150 *golden guineas*; but, if I obtain that sum, I shall be quite satisfied. And, it is not, I assure Sir Vicary Gibbs, the "*base lucre*" which stimulates me. It is not the money, so much as the medal, that I am anxious to win; and, most assuredly, I shall, if I have life and health, put in my claim. For, though this Academy, if it be like most others, will not like to patronize a writer, in whose work *truth* will be a principal ingredient, I will, at least, put them to the test; and, if they reject my claim, the world will be able to judge of them as well as of the rival historians. I do not much relish the putting off of the period of payment till May, 1812; for, we live in ticklish times; we live in times when so many and such great changes are continually occurring, that there does not appear to me to be any very solid ground to hope for payment, unless that payment is to take place in a few hours after the epoch with which the history is to close. However, I must stand my chance as well as others; and the only thing I shall insist upon is, that, if I win, a real *golden medal* shall be awarded me; and nothing in the shape of *paper-money*.—Here I start, then, with a resolution to do my best.—Before I proceed to the contents of the last dispatches, it will be necessary to take a look backward and see, what the Duke of Dalmatia says, with regard to some circumstances relating to the battle of Albuera. It will be recollected that no official statement of *numbers* was, upon that occasion, furnished us by our commander.

The Duke of Dalmatia, in his general orders, issued about the 20th of June, says, that on that memorable day, 20,000 French fought 45,000 enemies; that they made 1,000 prisoners; that they took six colours and five cannon; and that, during the battle General Philippon made a sally from the town of Badajoz, and destroyed the works which the English had erected.

—Now, I am not inclined to believe this Duke of Dalmatia, upon his bare word, any more than any other military commander; but what I do believe is, that the Duke of Dalmatia would not wish to pass amongst his own soldiers and officers, for a notorious liar; and, therefore, I do believe that this statement of his must be pretty nearly the truth; because, if false, that falsehood must have been immediately known to every man in his army, this being, not a dispatch to amuse the people at home, but an *order* issued in his army, and read, of course, at the head of every company in that army.—There can be little doubt, then, I think, that the French did take *six* English standards in the battle of Albuera, though, in the reported speech of Mr. Perceval, mention was made of only *two*. At any rate, the French did take some standards, and nobody has yet pretended to say that the allies took any. Yet, the ministerial news-papers tell us, that when the news of our victory at Albuera reached St. Petersburg, the court was delighted, the rich people gave balls and other entertainments in the way of rejoicing, and that even the Russian soldiers shouted for joy! But, what have they not told this “*most thinking people*” in all Europe?—To return to the consequences of raising the siege of Badajoz: Lord Talavera informs us, that the enemy had drawn together the whole of their force from Castile, their whole force from Madrid, and all their force from Andalusia, excepting what was absolutely necessary to maintain their position before Cadiz, together with the force under Sebastiani in the Eastern Kingdoms of Andalusia. He adds, that they have abandoned Old and New Castile, with the exception of a small garrison in Madrid, and have risked every thing, in all parts of Spain, in order to collect this large army in Estremadura.—From this picture, one would be led to suppose, that all the rest of Spain and Portugal was totally deserted by the French, and that we might expect, soon to hear, that Spain was totally free of

them. But, we are told, indeed, that there is a *small* garrison left in Madrid, and that the necessary number of troops remain posted, before Cadiz: that is to say, that the metropolis of Spain is in the hands of the French, and that they have cut off the only great sea port town and naval arsenal from all communication with the land. Madrid is mentioned, here, in a very slight way, but the mention is worthy of particular notice.—We of this “*most thinking*” nation, have a thousand times been told, that *all around Madrid the Guerillas* (a *Volunteer Corps*, I suppose) were in such force and so extremely active, that King Joseph was in the utmost danger, being, besides, held in the utmost abhorrence by the people of the city itself, who only waited for a fair opportunity of rising upon him and his partisans; and further, our industrious news-papers have furnished this “*most thinking people*” with divers *intercepted letters* from King Joseph to his brother Napoleon, complaining, in most desponding terms, of the state in which he was placed, of the dangers to which he was exposed, and earnestly praying to be suffered to abandon an enterprize that promised nothing but vexation in the progress and ruin in the end. But, *now*, behold, after all this, our own Commander in Chief gives us, under his hand, an assurance, that there is only a *small garrison* in Madrid, and, that there are no French troops, at all, in the whole of the country round about it; which, I take it, is a pretty satisfactory proof, of one of these two things; either, that what we were before told, was shamefully false, or, that the Guerillas are become less active than they were, that the people of Madrid have changed their opinions, that King Joseph's situation is become less dangerous, and his prospects more fair.—In the next dispatch, (see page 153.) our commander tells us, that the cavalry of the French army succeeded in cutting off a *picket* of the 11th dragoons, who mistook a body of the enemy, for a body of our own troops; and he says, that the 2d Hussars, also, *suffered* on their retreat towards Elvas.—Now, let us hear what Dalmatia says upon this subject. He says (see page 152), that a *brigade* of French cavalry, and not “*the cavalry of the French army*,” having the first regiment of the Vistula, at its head, destroyed, not “*a picket*” of our horse, but two squadrons of the eleventh regiment of English

light horse, and of the Hanoverian hussars; and he says, that three officers and 150 horsemen with their horses remained prisoners in the hands of the French; to which he adds, that ten other squadrons of English horse remained at a distance, and did not choose to engage. These stories differ very widely, and I should be in no great hurry to give implicit confidence to the statement of the French general, but, the reader will bear in mind, that this regiment of the Vistula, who appear to have been engaged here, are part of those same *Polish lancers* who made such bloody work of it in the battle of Albuera. The *Courier* news-paper, in speaking of these lancers, says, upon the authority of a private letter from an officer in our army, that, they are a set of brutal *savages* who *butcher* all they can come near, and who never give any quarter.—Indeed! upon my word, it is dangerous to have to deal with fellows of this description; fellows who do not know when they have enough of it; fellows who seem to understand nothing at all of that civility and mutual forbearance, which is, sometimes, practised in war. No wonder that this gentleman should speak of them in such harsh terms, but they know, I suppose, best what suits their employer; and the only thing that we can do, is, I should think, to get, as soon as we can, some horsemen of the same description; for, it is very provoking, to see these lancers carry off whole squadrons at a time, of our cavalry, in spite of all their furs and their tippets and their whiskers. If these lancers are resolved to give no quarter, why should not we have men that will give no quarter? I have no notion of this species of liberality in the field. If we are to have war, let it be war; and let us deal the enemy as hard blows as he deals us.—On the 28th of June (see page 153) we have another dispatch from the Duke of Dalmatia, in which His *Grace* tells us, that the English General has sent off 8,000 sick and wounded, with all his baggage, to Lisbon; he says, besides, that *great numbers of deserters from the English army* come in to him. This is intelligence of a very serious aspect indeed; and if it be true, it accounts for a great deal of what I could not, otherwise, account for. This dispatch has been published in London about a fortnight, and has received no contradiction from any body. Let us hope, that it will receive a contradiction from the head quarters of our army; for,

this intelligence is, to me, of a nature more inauspicious than any that I have, hitherto, had to remark upon.—It appears strange to most people, that General Blake should not have remained with our army; and to account for this, the *Morning Post* informed its wise readers, that Blake had been sent off by Lord Talavera into the rear of the Duke of Dalmatia. This assertion was repeated by another venal print, the *Courier*, of the 15th of July, when it asserted that our General, by a masterly manœuvre, had thrown a large force in the rear of the enemy; that he had detached Blake with the Spaniards towards Seville; that Blake, with 15,000 men, was pushing on, in that direction, and that General Graham was advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Blake. This manœuvre, the venal writer said, reminded him, of a similar one, practised by that consummate General, *Gustavus Adolphus*. But, we must take the article itself: it is not long, and it is a pretty instance, enough, of the, at once false and stupid publications by which this “most *thinking* nation,” suffers itself to be amused: “We hear that Lord Wellington has, by a *masterly manœuvre*, thrown a large force in the rear of the enemy. Soult having boasted that he had entirely relieved the Southern Provinces from all danger of attack, Lord Wellington, as a commentary upon that boast, has detached General Blake with the Spaniards under his command towards Seville. Blake, with 15,000 men, crossed the Guadiana, while the French were advancing, and then, by a counter-march, re-crossed, taking the direction of Seville. As Victor has joined Soult with the larger part of his force, General Graham is advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Gen. Blake. The effect of this will be the obliging Marmont to detach a force to the southward to overawe Blake, or the increasing the difficulties of drawing supplies for the subsistence of so large an army. This manœuvre of Lord Wellington’s, reminds us of a similar one practised by that consummate General, *Gustavus Adolphus*. When Wallenstein with a vastly superior force was advancing against him, he retreated, intrenched himself, and sent off half his army to Wallenstein’s rear, to ravage the country and cut off his supplies. The effect of this was, that Wallenstein was at length forced to retreat with all possible speed to prevent his troops from being

"starved."—A string of falsehoods, of pure unmixed falsehoods, from the beginning to the end! No troops did Lord Talavera send in the rear of the enemy; never did he detach General Blake towards Seville, or towards any other point; General Blake never made any movement in that direction; Marshal Victor (the Duke of Bellona) never moved from Madrid; General Graham, so far from advancing from Cadiz to co-operate with Blake, had, at that time, actually quitted his command at Cadiz, and was coming round to Lisbon, by sea; and Lord Talavera, so far from having imitated, upon this occasion, the manœuvre, said to have been practised by that consummate General, Gustavus Adolphus, had collected around him, all his forces, and had put his army on the high road towards Lisbon. These facts have, now, been proved to us. It appears, from Lord Talavera's own dispatches, that so far from detaching Blake, he hardly knew *what was become of him*, for, in his dispatch of the 27th of June, he says that he understands, that Blake was at Castillejos on the 24th of that month. And in his dispatch of the 4th of July, he says, that he has no authentic account of General Blake's movements, since the 27th of June. It appears, that Blake, so far from marching towards Seville, intended to embark his troops for Cadiz, but, says Lord Talavera in his dispatch of the 11th of July, "Neither General Castanos nor I have heard from him, since the 18th of June!" This was the General, who, as our hireling prints told us, was detached, after the manner of that consummate General, Gustavus Adolphus, into the rear of the enemy, by the same commander that has since told us that he did not know what was become of him. It appears that Blake made an attempt to obtain possession of a place, garrisoned only by about 300 men, and failed in the attempt, though we are told, by the above writer, that he had under his command, 15,000 men. From Lord Talavera's dispatch of the 18th of July, which is the last yet received, or, at least, the last that I have seen, it appears, that Blake actually embarked, with his army, on the 6th of July; so that he and his Spaniards have entirely quitted the grand scene of action.—I have thus gone over rather in detail some of the most prominent circumstances of the war, down to as late a period as our intelligence reaches; and let me, now, appeal to the reader, whether I was not more correct

than Mr. Perceval, as to the prospects of that war, at the time when Massena retreated out of Portugal; whether the public would not have been wise if they had followed my advice and had hesitated, before they believed that Portugal was delivered, and that the deliverance of all Europe was about speedily to follow. At that time, when the motion for a vote of thanks was made by Mr. Perceval, he stated several advantages which would arise out of what he called the triumph, which had then taken place, but the principal advantage was this, that "we now know, that we shall have a British army to defend our country, if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores; an army that has uniformly beaten the army of the enemy, commanded by Generals who have out-Generaled the Generals of the enemy."—At the time when this was delivered, by the minister, and when the huzzas were spreading through the country, I endeavoured to give a check to the exultation by observing, how degrading it was for us to acknowledge that we had not, till now, discovered that we had an army able to defend our own shores against the French; but, I more particularly dwelt on the dangerous tendency of such exultation; because, if it should finally turn out that our army in Portugal was unable to withstand that of the French, the inference, upon Mr. Perceval's principle, would be, that we had *not* an army to defend our country if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores. This danger, events have now made apparent; for, we see that our army has had ample opportunities to cope with the enemy; we have seen it engaged in two battles with that enemy; we have seen it twice the besieger of that enemy; we have seen it blockading Almeida; we have seen it at the breach at Badajoz; and we have seen the result. Now, then, if we were to adopt Mr. Perceval's mode of reasoning, what a disheartening conclusion must we draw? I told him, at the time, not by any means, to make the question, whether we had an army capable of defending our country against the French, if ever the battle should be brought to our own shores; I told him, not to make the affirmative of this question rest upon any success that had been gained by our army in Portugal, because, said I, if that army should be beaten by the French, or should be obliged to retreat before them, the conclusion upon your own principles will be,

that we have not an army to defend our country, and that, in case of invasion, by France, we may give the thing up at once, without a struggle.—Of the same dangerous tendency are all the flattering pictures which have been drawn, relative to the situation of affairs in Spain as well as Portugal; and, if those pictures be true, I hesitate not to say, that our situation is most desperate indeed.—We have been told repeatedly, and from what ought to be the best authority, that the Emperor Napoleon is detested and abhorred through the whole of the peninsula; that he has no partizans amongst the people in any part of those countries; that the people are every where the cordial friends of England; that they so sincerely detest the French, that they voluntarily destroy their corn fields, their cattle, their barns, their mills, their houses, their furniture, and almost the very clothes upon their backs, rather than leave a chance of any part of them falling into the hands of the French. One would suppose, from even the official accounts that we receive, that a pretty girl would regret her beauty and would almost lacerate her visage, hammer out her teeth, and flatten down her bosom to the shape, and give it the colour of an oak board, rather than charm the eyes of a Frenchman. This, would, to be sure, be an instance of most ferocious vindictiveness. But, really, to read the dispatches of our Generals, and the speeches of our ministers, even this, is not more than we might, reasonably expect.—Well, then, how stands the case? Here are we, carrying on a war with Napoleon, with all the means, of every sort, that we are able to muster; and the theatre, of that war, is, a country, containing about 13 or 14 millions of people, the whole of whom, we say, are *for us* and *against him*. We have in our pay, 60,000 men of Portugal: these are actually in our pay, and make part of our army, and, our Generals have said that they are as good troops as any in the world. Besides these there are, we are told, many thousands of Portuguese militia; there are several Spanish armies; there are, we are told, in every quarter and corner of Spain, Guerillas, or Volunteer Corps, who are very numerous, and who, upon all occasions, behave in the most gallant manner: how stands the case, then? Here we are, with all our own means, of every kind, and with all those other means, that I have now been speaking of, carrying on a war, with Napoleon,

in the midst of a people, nearly equal in population to England, Scotland and Ireland, all put together, all those people being *for us* and *against him*, and, yet, we see, that he still holds his ground; that his brother is in possession of the metropolis of Spain; that, he, in fact, reigns in Spain; that the Spanish regency are cut off from the land, being besieged in a little island, by a French army; and, that, our main army, under the General which our Minister and Parliament have lately thanked, have, recently, been compelled to raise the siege of a very important fortress, upon the approach of a part of the forces of Napoleon, and have actually been compelled to place themselves in a state, in which, it is evident that a safe retreat is the main thing provided for.—Now, how disheartening are the reflections which this picture is calculated to excite! For, if this be the state of the case, in the peninsula, what must we expect to be the lot of England or Ireland, in case of invasion? This is a thought that seems never to have occurred to those who have been boasting of the zeal and enthusiasm and valour and perseverance of the "*universal Spanish nation*." If it had occurred to them, they would have perceived, that such assertions taken into view with the events of the war, formed the greatest possible compliment to the French armies, and the most serious grounds of alarm for any country liable to be invaded by those armies. For, what can the people of any nation be more than our ministers and their writers have asserted of the people of the peninsula; what can the people of this country be more, than zealous, enthusiastic in their country's defence, brave, persevering, and implacable in their hatred against the enemy: what can they be more than this? and yet we see, that all these excellent qualities united in the people of Spain and Portugal, do not drive the French out; there are 13 millions of these people, and yet, a French army remains in the heart of their country, has been there for three years, still holds their metropolis, has established a government sufficient for the imposition and collection of taxes over a large part of the country, and, in short, rules a much greater half of the two kingdoms. What a fearful thing, then, must a French army be, if all that we have been told, in the dispatches of Generals and the speeches of ministers be true? We are often told, that if we are *true to ourselves*

(a favourite expression of Pitt and George Rose when they were proposing new taxes); if we are true to ourselves, if we are united, if we join heart and hand, we have nothing to fear from the enemy, land when he will. But if what our Generals and Ministers tell us be true, the Spaniards and Portuguese *are* true to themselves, they *are* united, they *have* joined heart and hand; and yet we do see, that their country is, in great part, commanded, possessed, and governed by a French army, and that army under the command of men, who, seventeen years ago, were either private soldiers, or were labourers or mechanics. Observe, too, that the 13 millions of people in the peninsula, have not only all their own means for their support, but are assisted with the means, the mighty means of England, who has, for the last three years, expended more, in the assisting of Spain and Portugal, than half the total amount of the revenues of France, extended as her dominion is over 50 or 60 millions of people. If a French army were to invade England or Ireland, from what foreign arm should we receive assistance? Manifestly, then, *if* what we have been told of the disposition of the people in Spain and Portugal be *true*, our fate would be certain, if invaded by a numerous French army. Therefore, what we have to hope, is, that the dispositions of the people of the peninsula, have not been truly described to us; that the people do *not* universally detest and abhor Napoleon; that the hatred of the French is *not* so outrageous as to induce a pretty girl to tear her cheeks and hammer out her teeth, lest, perchance, she should be so unfortunate as to charm the eyes and win the heart of a Frenchman. Let us hope that this is *not* quite true; and, indeed, the success of the French, in the first instance, as well as their having remained so long in the Peninsula, pretty clearly prove, that is not true.—I do not, and I never have, liked the notion, that *our* safety, that our means of defence, is to be judged of by any thing that has passed, or can pass, in Spain and Portugal; because, as I have more than once said, we *may* ultimately *fail* there, and, then, there is nothing left for us but *despair*, a shocking state for any nation to be in, and, assuredly, the fore-runner of its subjugation; because, from the moment it despairs, it will, of course, take no measures for its safety.—It is for this reason,

that I have always endeavoured to inculcate the opinion, that the war in the Peninsula is not of such great importance as the ministerial writers would fain persuade us that it is. They represent it as all in all; as every thing to us; as a thing for the success of which we ought to grudge no sacrifices, whether in men or in money. It is true, that unless we do regard it in this light, we cannot easily reconcile ourselves to the enormous cost which it occasions; but, whatever those sacrifices may be, it is far better that they should be incurred uselessly, and it is far better that they should be regarded as pure waste, than that the people of this country should believe, that the fate of England depends, even in the smallest degree, upon the fate of Spain and Portugal; because, and I cannot repeat it too often, if they once imbibed that opinion, from the hour that Spain and Portugal shall be subdued, from that hour will England be plunged in despair. I do not say, observe, that the danger to England would not be increased by the subjugation of Spain and Portugal; for, I am convinced, that that danger would be greatly increased; but I well know, that there is no danger equal to national despair.—If the war, in those countries, should end in the deliverance of them from the French, and in a complete establishment of their independence, it certainly will have greatly contributed to the safety of this country against the designs of Napoleon. But, if the war finally terminate in the subjugation of the peninsula by France, then the more that termination is distant, the worse it will be for us; because, the longer the war continues the more we shall be exhausted; and, of course, the less able to withstand the rude assaults which we may then reasonably expect. And, it should always be borne in mind, that these wars do not exhaust the enemy in the same way that they exhaust us. He has 50 millions of people, from amongst whom he draws his armies; he makes those armies find the means of their own support in the countries where they are; he neither gives nor talks of compensation; he comes amongst the people as a conqueror; to those who submit he offers protection, to those who resist he offers the sword, but from all he exacts the means of maintaining his armies; his declared object is to destroy the old governments, and, of course, he seizes upon all the property of those governments, he

confis-
bility,
We,
armies
millio
nies,
the p
pensa
injur
inhab
in th
not to
the p
mous
is not
to ma
and
order
we c
what
Let i
work
for c
stren
and
part
at th
he n
a sta
him
us:
and
jects
so ea
now
a fle
in p
take
opin
tion
it.
out
poss
desi
him
the
time
tenc
esta
cess
in
affo
aga
tual
pen
and
it d
at
qua
has

confiscates that of the church, of the nobility, and of all public establishments. We, on the contrary, have to draw our armies from a population of 14 or 15 millions of people; we maintain our armies, by the means of taxes levied upon the people of England; we make compensation, to some extent, at least, for the injuries we are compelled to do to the inhabitants; we go not as conquerors, but in the character of friends; we profess not to inflict punishment on any part of the people, but hold them to be unanimous in our favour; our declared object is not to destroy the old governments, but to maintain them, or to re-establish them, and to preserve or restore, all the former orders, ranks, and properties. So that, we contend with most fearful odds, in whatever way the comparison is made. Let it be observed, too, that *time*, which works against us, works with equal force, for our enemy, who is daily gaining strength, by the internal arrangement, and consolidation of his power, in every part of his dominions. We feel impatient at the lagging of the war in the peninsula: he need feel no such impatience: war is a state, which, at present, is necessary to him: peace would thwart his views against us: it would give rise to an intercourse and to discussions adverse to his vast projects: to kindle a new war might not be so easy a matter; and, as his chief object now must be, and evidently is, to form a *fleet*, that work could not go on so fast in peace as in war.—It is impossible to take this view of the war without being of opinion, that it is the wish and the intention of Napoleon to *protract the duration of it*. His interest so manifestly points this out to him, that one can hardly suppose it possible, that it should not be his settled design. The war is at a distance from him; it leaves him at leisure to settle all the other parts of his empire, at the same time that it furnishes him with a fair pretence for keeping on foot great military establishments, which are absolutely necessary to the consolidation of his sway in several quarters of his dominions; it affords him grounds for all his measures against our commerce; it serves to habituate the people of the Continent to dispense with all communication with us; and, above all things, it *exhausts*, it *wastes*, it draws out the very life-blood of England, at the same time, that it augments the quantity of her bank-notes, and, of course, hastens their depreciation. — All this

Napoleon well knows. Eight years ago, he called out to us: "*Pay your bank notes in gold, and then the world will believe in the solidity of your resources, without your going to war to prove it.*" The *Moniteur* said this in answer to a fine flaming speech of the then minister (Addington); and, from that day to this the Emperor seems to have had his eye pretty steadily fixed upon the work going on in Threadneedle Street. If he has, it is impossible that he should not wish to protract the war in the Peninsula, which creates such a quantity of bank notes. And, indeed, is there not every appearance that his generals are acting upon this plan? The Duke of Belluno lies very quietly before Cadiz; Marshal Suchet having got possession of Tarragona, has sit himself down there; King Joseph is quiet at Madrid; and the army under their Graces, Soult and Marmont, having rescued Badajoz from danger, seem to have taken care *not to discourage* the Conde de Vimiera (the new title which has just been given to Lord Talavera, it seems, by the Prince Regent of Portugal) from *receiving reinforcements and supplies*, which, if the news-papers speak truth, he is continually receiving in great abundance. The movements of the French Generals are precisely such as are calculated to encourage the Conde to call for more troops. The French Generals push on towards him with a formidable front: he draws back, feeling himself not strong enough for them: they stand and look at him, and seem to be afraid to attack: this induces him to wish for more troops; and, as far as the government is able, that wish is instantly gratified. The French harrass him with marches, compel him to expend enormous sums of money, wear out his men and his horses, so that, the waste from mere sickness has greatly surpassed the destruction by the sword.—It is impossible that any plan of warfare can be, to the French, so advantageous as this. Here they have found out a spot, to which we are resolved to send all the resources of every kind that we can get together. While we kept upon the *sea*, or, in our *islands*, guarded by the sea, they could not touch us. They had no means either of killing our people or destroying our property. But, they have, at last, found out a spot, to which we cheerfully send men and horses and money and every thing belonging to us, that they can wish to see destroyed or wasted. The *MORNING CHRONICLE* of the 8th instant, says: "Our

“troops complain of the unwholesome and
 “tormenting climate in which they are
 “posted. It is almost impossible to de-
 “scribe the effects of the burning heat of
 “the day followed by the noxious va-
 “pours of the night. The myriads of in-
 “sects by which they are incessantly as-
 “sailed, are also not merely troublesome
 “but pernicious, for they inflame and
 “blister the body to a degree of fever:
 “and in this situation they are doomed to
 “remain, we suppose, *until Buonaparté*
 “*shall enable his Generals to resume the of-*
 “*fensive!*” — Resume the *offensive!* Why,
 what are they doing now. Have they not
 just made the Conde de Vimiera raise the
 siege of Badajoz after he had made *three*
 breaches on its ramparts? Has he not
 drawn backwards? Is not this acting upon
 the *offensive* on the part of the French?
 Their object clearly was to drive him
 away from Badajoz, to keep that import-
 ant place in their hands, and then to let
 him lie as far from Lisbon as possible, and
 there continue to support his army and
 his hospitals at an enormous expence.
 Aye, to be sure, the heat and the insects
 and the fevers are what the French wish
 to leave our army to! This is a situation
 in which our enemy must wish to see our
 army. It is a situation that daily creates
 a necessity for fresh supplies. There is,
 in the TIMES newspaper (which has be-
 come one of the most nauseously slavish)
 an article, of the 8th instant, affecting to
 regard the armies of Dalmatia and Ragusa
 as being *dispersed!* Thus it is that this na-
 tion is cheated. A succession of falshoods
 is poured out from a venal press, and,
 when shewn to be false, none of them are
 ever contradicted. Thus it has been,
 and thus it will be, as long as this war in
 the Peninsula shall last; and, when that
 is over, some other subject will be started,
 equally fruitful in falshood and fraud.

IMPOSTOR PAPER.—In my last, at
 page 144, I noticed the vile imposture,
 which has recently been attempted to be
 practised upon “the *most thinking* people
 “in Europe” by the venal prints of Lon-
 don, especially the COURIER and the TIMES,
 which are the principal channels for the
 circulation of “*intercepted letters*,” and other
 things of the kind, all evidently proceed-
 ing from one and the same manufactory.
 —The *Impostor Paper*, which I am now
 about to notice a little more fully than I
 did before, and which I shall insert in the
 present sheet, if possible, is certainly a

very bold attempt at imposition; but,
 after what this nation has swallowed, what
 may it not be expected to swallow? After
 sucking down George Rose’s doctrine
 about “the blessed comforts of religion;”
 after sucking down the belief, that, *if they*
did not give their money freely to be handled
 and disposed of by Pitt and Rose and the
 rest of those who were in power, they
 would not only *lose their lands and houses*,
 but that they would be made *atheists* and
 have all the “*blessed comforts of religion*”
 taken away from them; after swallow-
 ing this, and after burning Paine in
 effigy because he wished to persuade
 them, that they might, if they chose,
 keep their money and their religion
 too; after this, one must confess, that
 a man will find it difficult to suppose
 an imposture the practising of which ought
 to be regarded as a proof of his temerity;
 for, what may not one expect such a peo-
 ple to believe.—The IMPOSTOR PAPER
 was, in my last, clearly *proved*, from in-
 ternal evidence, to be a forgery. We
 shall, hereafter, learn something more
 about the *origin* of; but, that it is as gross
 a forgery as the famous *Eclair* was, there
 can be no doubt at all.—Let me now,
 then, ask what could be the *object* of this
 forgery? It is a *foolish* paper: it verifies
 the old maxim, than which nothing is
 truer; namely, that *knaves* are generally
fools.—The object is to incense that part
 of us, who are friends of public liberty,
 against Napoleon, by representing him as
 a determined enemy of every reform of
 abuses, and as having resolved to eradicate
 the last remaining fibres of freedom in
 England.—Poor trick! Miserable shift!
 —And, hereupon, we are told, that *now*,
 since this paper is come to light, there can
 be no man in England, especially if he be
 a lover of liberty, who must not abhor
 Napoleon; and that any man who would
 propose a *peace* with him must be a *traitor*.
 —Poor trick! Miserable shift! But,
 why attempt this trick? Did the contrivers
 of it suppose, that there was any part of
 the people in this country, who *liked* Na-
 poleon? Is it possible that they could
 have supposed *that*? Oh! what a *foolish*
 as well as knavish crew? But, what a
 state are they come to, when they are
 driven to attempt to *scare* the Jacobins and
 Levellers with a notion that they would
 lose *their liberties* if Napoleon could have
 his will? Verily they are a silly and a
 wicked set of men.—The *Impostor*
 Paper has all the internal marks of a

forgery. It breathes sentiments hostile to the views which Napoleon must entertain, if he does not wish for the overthrow of his own power; for, despot as he may be, he cannot wish for what is attributed to him in this paper. If he was the real author of the paper in question, how are we to account for the following publication, which has appeared in the *Paris papers*, and which has been published in the London papers, and especially in the *Courier* of the 6th instant. It relates to certain reforms in the States of the King of Prussia; and, as will be seen, the French paper expresses its approbation of those reforms, though of a Democratical cast.—

"According to all the accounts which reach us, there is actually formed in the Prussian States, a very marked opposition to the system pursued by Government, and to the numerous ameliorations, which it is executing in the different branches of the Administration. While all those who do not belong to the privileged classes, applaud this system, and a certain number of the members of the noblesse also support it, the principles which the Government has laid down, experience the strongest opposition on the part of many of the nobles, who see, in these innovations, the destruction of social order. These factious men are incapable of entering into the new ideas, and do not perceive that the genius of the age imperiously calls for those changes which the Prussian Government has thought it necessary to introduce. The suppression of feudal rights, and the equalisation of burthens and taxes, are the circumstances which excite the chief animosity; though all enlightened politicians have proved to a demonstration, that they are the only means of recovering Prussia from the unfortunate situation in which she was placed by the consequences of the last war, and by her ancient organization, which no longer harmonises with the other states of Europe."

—Now, I am sure that I shall not be told by any of our writers, that this would have been published at Paris without the approbation of Napoleon; and, if he approved of this, is it to be believed, that he would sanction a dispatch containing the sentiments of the *Impostor Paper*?—But, what signifies it to us what his opinions about government are? What have his opinions to do with us? If he could conquer our country, he would, of course, do what he liked with us as to government; but who is coward enough to sup-

pose that he will be able to do that, if we be resolved to defend our country? That man who can calculate upon the possibility of a conquest of the country, will never do much towards defending it; and, if a whole people could so calculate, they might be set down as more than half conquered already.—What, then, is the sense of this vile imposture? How, supposing it to be generally believed, could it operate in the way that the venal inventors would have it, namely, to make us all resolve never to have peace with Napoleon? He may think even as they represent him as thinking; he may be the author of such a paper; but, is that a reason for us to do either more or less against him! Are we never to have peace with him, because he wishes (as they tell us) to see our government annihilated? Why, do not we wish to see his government annihilated? Is there scarcely a day which does not bring forth an expression of this sort from our venal prints? And, yet, I'll warrant you, he never will be fool enough to call upon the people of France to fight up to their knees in blood on that account. This is a ground of eternal war that he would never be fool enough to put forward, whatever he think or wish.—The inventors of this stupid forgery seem to have known nothing at all of the bias of the parties, to whom they ascribe the agency in the publication; for, Mr. John Quincy Adams, who is the American Minister at Petersburg, has no such leaning towards this country as they state him to have; and, though his father, Mr. John Adams, the successor of General Washington in the Presidency, had formerly such leaning, he has long since changed his opinion, and has frankly stated it to the people of America. And, besides, how improbable is it, that he should have made public a paper confidentially communicated to his son, a Foreign Minister, and still residing at the court who confidentially communicated the paper to him!—After all, however, the best answer of all is, the flat denial of the fact of publication in the *American Newspaper*. It is stated in the *Courier* and *Times*, that the paper was published in the *New York Advertiser* of the 24th of June. Now, I believe, that there is no paper of that Title; but, this I know, that other New York papers of the 24th, 25th of June, and from that day regularly on to the 12th of July, contain not only no such article, but no mention of, or allusion to, such article. So that the whole thing ap-

pears to be a sheer fabrication; a poor, mean, base device to answer the most silly purpose that can be imagined. Men, capable of such an act, are capable of any thing: of such men every thing bad is to be presumed; and, there can be no room for doubt, that, if they had it in their power, they would alter and falsify any real dispatch, state paper, or any other document, provided only that they thought such falsification calculated to answer their purpose. Whether this shameful attempt at deception may produce its proper effect, that is, prevent the authors of it from being ever believed again, is more than I can say; but, of this I am sure, that, if it does not produce that effect, this nation is doomed to fall a sacrifice to falsehood, fraud, and imposture, practised upon it by the most weak and cowardly, though the most malignant of mankind.

WM. COBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
August 9, 1811.*

GOLDEN RULES FOR JURYMEN.

From that excellent Work, Sir Richard Phillips's "POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES," a Work which every man in England ought to read.

1. An honest Jurymen should die, rather than consent to a verdict which he feels to be unjust; or which in his own private judgment is not warranted by incontrovertible affirmative evidence.

2. The worst of social miseries being oppression, under colour and form of law, the sole hope and dependence of accused persons is on the good sense, integrity, and firmness of honest men in the Jury-box.

3. The attendance of Jurymen at any trial might have been dispensed with, if any other opinion than their own were to make the decision; and their office would be a mockery on themselves, on the parties, and on their country, if their decisions were not their own, and were not unshackled and independent.

4. In framing the verdict, every Jurymen is bound to exercise his own judgment, to give his private opinion freely and boldly, to remember his oath, and not to forget that the sole and entire object of the institution of Juries is to decide on their own consciences in regard to the points at issue.

5. The Jury are bound to decide fully and finally on the point at issue by a ge-

neral verdict, unless some mere point of law is expressly reserved and stated by desire of the Judge; but such special verdict should be final and conclusive in regard to the facts.

6. Every man is presumed to be innocent, till he has clearly been proved to be guilty; no man being bound, required, or expected, to prove his own innocence, the onus of the proof of guilt lying entirely on the accuser.

7. It is better that a hundred guilty persons escape punishment, than that one innocent man should be unjustly convicted.

8. The issue of a criminal trial involves every thing dear to the accused, if he be found guilty; but his acquittal, if perchance he were guilty, is comparatively unimportant to the public.

9. Every Jurymen should do to the accused, or to plaintiff and defendant, as he would those parties should do to him were their situations changed.

10. As the decision of a Jury must be unanimous, every Jurymen is individually responsible to his own conscience, and morally responsible to the parties for the justice or injustice of the verdict.

11. A Jurymen should discharge his mind from preconceived prejudices, be on his guard against prejudices of the Court, and decide on facts only, and on the valid evidence sworn in Court.

12. He should carefully consider how far the evidence sanctions the charge of a criminal design, no act being criminal, or involving guilt and responsibility, which was not committed with a criminal mind or intention.

13. No man is punishable for the crime or act of another; so that no prejudice should lie against a prisoner, or person accused, because a crime has been committed, if it is not brought home to him by distinct and indubitable testimony.

14. Warning to others, and not revenge on the culprit, is the design of legal punishment; the decisions of Juries should, therefore, be made dispassionately, and not be influenced by sinister appeals to their feelings.

15. The subsequent punishment is generally founded on the abstract fact of the conviction, and not always influenced by the merits or demerits of the case; therefore, as the laws are made for extreme cases, the Jury ought to recommend the convicted to mercy, as often as they perceive a justifiable reason.

16. In assessing damages between party

and party, Jurymen should respect that equitable principle of *Magna Charta*, cap. 14, which in amercements even to the Crown reserves to every man the means of future subsistence; to a husbandman his implements; to a workman his tools; and to a merchant his merchandise.

17. In trying charges of libel, sedition, or treason, the Jury should be vigilantly on their guard against prejudices raised by the influence of the Administration for the time being; and they should bear in mind that it is in such causes chiefly that Juries are so eminently the barriers of public liberty, and the guardians of weak individuals against concentrated power.

18. In libel causes, Juries ought to know that Mr. Fox's Libel Bill has legally constituted them the sole independent judges of the intention of the parties; and consequently it lies entirely in their own judgment and discretion, to decide on the merit, the innocency, or the criminality, of an alledged libel.

19. He should commit the material points to writing, weigh maturely the evidence on both sides, and decide on his own intuitive perceptions of right and wrong.

20. The Foreman should ascertain and equally respect every opinion in the Jury. The verdict when unanimously settled, should be solemnly delivered; and in debating upon it every Jurymen should recollect that he is acting for his country; and that for the time being he is the arbiter of justice, and the living guardian for his posterity of those rights of Jurymen, which have been transmitted to him by his forefathers.

IMPOSTOR PAPER.

The following Paper was first published, in England, in the COURIER news paper of the 30th of July, 1811.—The Publisher pretends, that he took it from an American Paper, the New York Advertiser of the 24th of June.—It is manifestly a fabrication from the beginning to the end; and there can be no doubt that its object was to cheat the people of England.—It was stated, in the COURIER, that this paper was delivered to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, that he sent it to his court, that his court gave a copy of it to Mr. John Quincy Adams, American Minister at Petersburg, that he sent a copy to his father in America, and that his father published it through the New York Ad-

vertiser.—The whole is a falshood, but the device is curious, and worthy of being recorded.

By the command of his Majesty the Emperor and King, my most gracious Sovereign, I transmit to your Excellency the following confidential communication. It displays an impartial view of the great question of peace and war; it shews clearly the source from which the past and present misery of mankind originate and flow. Had, some centuries ago, the British islands been swallowed up in the seas that encompass them, the European Continent would have contained only a grand and united family. Witnessing its superior civilization and prosperity, the inhabitants of the other parts of the world would then have strived to obtain with it social compact, or a political adoption. The slaughter of generations, and the devastation of nations would then have been unknown. A slight chastisement would then have been sufficient to intimidate the refractory, and to correct the disobedient. The true God would then have been worshipped by all nations. Dutiful subjects would then have hailed their prince as another providence. But when men begin to canvass the adoration of their heavenly Creator, they will not long hesitate to assail the prerogatives of their earthly Sovereigns. Rebellion is the twin brother of impiety: anarchy and atheism are their common offspring. The English Wickliff had the sacrilegious audacity to propose innovations in religion, long before the Bohemian Huss and the Saxon Luther proclaimed themselves heretics. The latter would not have dared to stir, had not England already distributed its poison among the Germans; they merely took advantage of a contagion, suffered to become popular by the ignorance and vices of the clergy, and by the apathy and impolicy of governments. Since this time, in particular, England has never been quiet within herself, and has never ceased to disturb the tranquillity of all other states. As might have been foreseen, the success of the religious innovators encouraged the attempt of political incendiaries. The Continent was inundated with the blasphemous and perverse reveries of English antichristians and English antimonarchists. They sapped the very foundation of social order. To prove their thorough contempt for all institutions, divine as well as sacred, they opened their temples to the most ignorant and vicious

of fanatics, delivered the most virtuous of their Kings into the hands of the most ferocious of regicides. How many millions of Continental Europeans have not bled, because these islanders had with impunity braved their God and butchered their Monarch? (Alas! said feelingly, his Imperial and Royal Majesty,* without their enormous perpetrations, Louis XVI might still have reigned, and a happy obscurity been my lot. Supreme authority is but an inadequate indemnity for my anxiety and labour to be the worthy sovereign of the greatest of nations.) In fact, if the infernal assassins of Louis XVI were debased Frenchmen, they had been tutored by English sophistry; they had been misled by the examples, or seduced by the gold, of the English factions. Is it not England alone which at this moment distracts Europe, and causes the blood of its children to be lavished in Turkey, Germany, Spain, Sicily, and Portugal? Has not his Imperial and Royal Majesty almost yearly, and in the midst of his most splendid achievements, presented the olive branch, always interwoven with laurels, to ungrateful England? How often has he not, from the bottom of his patriotic soul, in vain exclaimed "Englishmen, I love you as men, and I esteem you as warriors! Let all human carnage be at an end! Let outraged humanity recover its too long lost rights! Let us be friends upon terms reciprocally honourable! Let our future rivalry be to enlighten, instead of destroying our fellow-beings!" But his Imperial and Royal Majesty has addressed himself to a Government too weak to dare to be just, and too powerful not to be able to do mischief; and to a nation too selfish to feel for the sufferings of others, and too licentious to attend to its real interests. It cannot longer be doubted, that mankind must continue to be disturbed, until the Constitution of the British Empire is reformed in a manner more congenial with the spirit of the constitutional charters, which at present secure the dignity and the power of sovereigns, and the obedience and safety of the subjects of the Continent. To effect such a salutary reform in the British Islands, the principal European Cabinets must be unanimous in their resolves, and firm and vigorous in their proceedings. England must fall prostrate if the Continent remain upright. The division and weakness of other States com-

pose her whole strength. Another Constitution must be offered her. If she prudently adopts it, her independence and dominions will be guaranteed: but if she is blind and obstinate enough to refuse, a solemn decree of all civilized governments will repudiate her for ever from the great family of the European commonwealth; and she shall be ranked for the future among the piratical States of Africa. No more neutrals shall be endured. Capital punishments shall be inflicted on the master and crew of the ships of any foreign country trading with her; and the law of high-treason shall be executed on smugglers, purchasers and sellers of her productions and commodities. These plans and regulations may at an imperfect view appear rather severe; but without them, a truce alone can be signed; but a peace can never be concluded between her and the Continent. This severity towards her is, therefore a real humanity with regard to all nations upon the globe, not excluding Great Britain herself. This fact may be proved without any difficulty, or the possibility of a contradiction. If Englishmen were made of those materials that compose all other people, it would require little knowledge of the human mind to foretell the most flattering issue, without resorting to extremities; but they differ totally from the rest of the human species.—Who can deny, that a British King, according to the organized constitutional anarchy of his kingdom, is now the most humble of slaves? When the monarch is not free, how dare his subjects talk of liberty? The truth is, that the bondage of Englishmen becomes heavier as it ascends; it emanates from the lowest of the rabble, a set of petty tyrants, ignorant and brutal, corrupt and oppressive.—Is that Monarch not a slave who is deprived of selecting his own counsellors and servants? Who, during a reign of half a century, has, among scores of ministers, not been surrounded by ten he could like or trust; by six, he could love or esteem? Are the fetters of that royal parent light, who during months is forced to see and hear a beloved son the butt of the most malignant passions, of the most malignant and debased of men? Do these ministers deserve the name of freemen, who are obliged to be undutiful and ungrateful to the Prince who has elevated them; to flatter a licentious mob, that despise and insult them? What must we

* Buonaparte.

think of the heads or hearts of sworn royal counsellors, who dare not save the bosom of their prince from torture and the character of his child from unjust ignominy: though they must know that the tormentors are the most profligate of villains, and the most unprincipled of conspirators? What must be the standard of the honour of a nobility, that not only not interferes between the infamous assailants of a prince of the blood, but suffers some of its own members to act as accomplices in the assault? Can those representatives of the people make any pretence to liberty, loyalty, or patriotism, who do not expel or punish the factions among them that try to stab monarchy by bespattering the son of their monarch? What freedom or what loyalty must these pretended friends of the throne possess, who, to shew their attachment to the royal family, purchase openly their future silence about one of the sons of their king, whom it was hardly possible any new slander could degrade, more than unnaturally to involve another son of the King in the disgrace of his brother? Can any decency or any loyalty be supposed to exist among the citizens of the first city of the British empire, who not only join the wild fiends of their sovereign every where, but encourage the senseless pratings of insolent and ignorant shopkeepers; never opening their mouths but to babble impertinence—but to bawl out treason? Did a single county interpose in the shamefully and cruelly audacious hunt of the Royal victim? Did not, on the contrary, every county emulate in this race of infamy, which should be foremost to wound the feeling of a venerable king, and to recompense the outrageous perpetrations of the bitter enemies of his domestic peace as much as his royal supremacy? Is it not evident, even to the most superficial observer, that either sound morality or rational liberty must be wanting in the British nation? If it would be uncharitable to suppose the former, it would also be ridiculous not to see the total absence of the latter.—In Great Britain faction meddles with every thing and every body: even the king is factious, in self-defence, for self-preservation. Have not however, both in ancient and modern times; both in Greece and France; both in Rome and in England; have not factions always been the most oppressive of despots? Have not factions always and every where, been the

companions of licentiousness, and the assassins of freedom? Have not factions at all times been intolerant, daring, unjust and incorrigible? To judge by the scandalous scenes in the British Islands, which an indignant continent has lamented of late, little hope remains that the factions there would desist from their nefarious deeds, were even France (as she might do) to produce damning evidence, for centuries past up to this very time, of every chief of factions; of every usurper of the name of patriot; and of every candidate for popularity in Great Britain, having either fixed his price to, or intrigued with, the enemies of his country; either accepted bribes, or received instructions, from rival or inimical cabinets. Though the majority might be convinced, a desperate minority would command. In England as has been the case in France, factions can never be mended: they must be extirpated. Some few persons, ambitious or bankrupt in characters and fortunes; will always, under the existence of the actual constitution of a Royal democracy, find opportunities to mislead the ignorant and to head the needy and the disaffected, in committing excesses dangerous to the peace of Europe, by contagious examples.—It belongs to history to recapitulate the many recent acts of the daring spirit of British factions, and of their influence on the internal and external politics of Great Britain—of their crimes towards humanity—of their common ferocity and barbarity. But had they not power, after trampling under their feet a Prince of the royal blood to extol the exploits of a General, who deliberated when he ought to have acted, who advanced when he should have retreated, and whose retreat was a disorderly flight before a handful of pursuers; while they force another General to resign, though victorious, because the climate, the elements, and other unforeseen occurrences, prevent him from succeeding to the whole extent of extravagant expectations? Have they not forced their king to leave unpunished a political agent,* who deserved to be impeached for want of ability or of integrity, in disobeying and disregarding his instructions? Have they not forced their King to leave unrewarded another political agent†, whose firmness, and whose obedience to the orders of his Sovereign, exposed him to public insult and

* Erskine. † Jackson.

personal dangers? Have they not forced their King to swallow, without daring to resent, these and other provocations, though offered by the most weak and contemptible of governments?† But in all the branches of the constitutional establishments of Great Britain, factions sway an anarchical iron sceptre, confounding, deranging, and invading all order. Has not a captain in the British fleet, cruising in Europe, dragged his admiral before a court-martial? Though the latter has been honourably acquitted, have not factions shielded the accuser from punishment? Have not officers serving in the British army in India seduced the soldiers to mutiny? Have they not, backed by faction, added rebellion to insubordination, and held out the most dastardly and perjurious proceeding as meritorious acts of patriotism and of retaliating justice? Is not the licentiousness of the British press such, that, protected and patronized by factions, a convicted libeller,§ published from his prison the most inflammatory of essays, defying the laws, and exciting civil discords: insulting equally the Judge who condemned him, and the Government that carried their sentence into execution? Has not a Chief of Faction,|| who is also a Member of Parliament, honestly told his assembly, that the nation was not represented by its Representatives, and that their country was not worth defending? Were they not instantly all on fire,—those very factions that shortly before, with such admirable and philosophical patience, heard the son of their King most unmercifully ill-used? Did not these friends of liberty immediately decree a mandate of arrest against the declaimer of this disagreeable truth, of this bold frankness? Now, British anarchy exhibited itself in all its dreadful glory. Faction combats faction. Numbers of lives are lost in the very streets of the capital, where a civil war rages with all its fury. But, mark; when, at last, the humanity of the King orders his guards to prevent farther bloodshed, a factious Jury pronounces them murderous, because they did their duty, and did not submit to be murdered themselves by the hands of the rebellious faction!!!—The proprietors of a theatre in London augment a trifle the prices of admittance. Englishmen, like the Romans of sanguinary memory, do not miss such a propitious opportunity

to create new factions. The most disgusting scenes, the effects of the most shameful licentiousness, transform the theatre into a field of battle for boxers and bruisers, for strumpets and pickpockets. Among a people that talk so much of respect for property, the property of individuals is openly invaded, and obliged to submit to the ruinous maximum of dictatorial factions. Ought it not to be apprehended, that prosperous anarchy will not stop at the door or in the pit of a theatre, but sooner or later force an entrance into banks, offices, and magazines: there, also, to affix its maximum—to inflict its requisitions?—Since the wisdom of his imperial and royal Majesty has instructed the Continent with regard to its true interest, continental warriors are no longer tributary to insular pedlars; and Englishmen, who, in exchange for their dearly sold superfluities, received from foreigners those necessities almost for nothing, began to dread a famine. To lessen the consumption for grain, government looked for some substitute for the distilleries. Their warehouses weighing down with perishable colonial produce; sugar naturally presented itself, and was proposed. The owners of lands took instant alarm; they formed an opposition; and during months, the grain and the sugar factions; with the theatrical and reforming factions; with the naval and the military factions; with the jacobin, the city, and the parliamentary factions; continued to engage the whole attention of a truly factious, divided, and licentious people. This is not the only instance when the interior of London forms a striking resemblance with the interior of Constantinople, at the period the Mussulmen were at its walls, and with their scymetars soon settled the disputes of the contending sects and parties.—Every foreign invader of the British Islands has become conqueror. Bankruptcy may dismantle mutiny may disperse, storms may destroy and victory may capture fleets, hitherto the sole protectors of Great Britain against the just wrath of his imperial and royal Majesty. Submission alone can prevent Britons from being, like the Batavians, erased from the list of independent nations. Resistance may retard in making more terrible the catastrophe, but it cannot alter their destiny. They have no choice left between obedience or conquest. The reigning House never produced a hero, and the domestic virtues of a Prince ruling this turbulent and factious people

† United States. § Cobbett. || Burdett.

weak pledges that the repose of continental nations will not still be disturbed or invaded. It remains, however, to be decided, whether a change of dynasty will be necessary, or a change of constitution will be thought sufficient. Long ago, the assent of his imperial and royal Majesty might have produced a general overthrow. Long ago have different factions caused to be laid before his imperial and royal Majesty, both requests for receiving support, and plans for effecting revolutions. But these are not times to encourage subjects to undermine established thrones. Monarchs alone shall hereafter be the judges of monarchs; and woe to the prince who resorts to an appeal to his people against the sentence of his equals!!! He has ceased to reign.

(Signed) Duke of CADORE.

Fountainbleau, Oct. 30, 1810.

To his Excellency _____,
(Most Confidential.)

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—TARRAGONA.—Paris, 25th July, 1811.—*Literal Translation of a Report of the Siege of Tarragona, which GENERAL CONTRERAS, Ex-Governor of that place, addressed to the Council of Regency. (Concluded from p. 160.)*

..... Before the fall of the place, I wrote and declared openly, that, upon the system on which operations were carried on, or rather, to speak more properly, meditated, the fortress, the garrison, and the army, would infallibly be lost. The Superior Junta of the principality can inform you of this, because I always took care to acquaint them with what was passing; on their side, they did all that they could, in order that the operation of raising the siege might be attempted, the only operation which it was necessary to be employed about and to execute without delay, and in concert with me, whatever were the numbers and nature of the enemy's force which we had to combat; but it was all in vain, and every day all this was less thought of at head-quarters, as will appear from the letter of General Campoverde, in which he orders me to send him 3,000 of the best troops of the garrison, who were to be embarked in the night of the 27th, under the orders of Colonel O'Rouan, who came to me for that purpose at eleven at night. I gave orders that he should embark with the regiment of Almeria; but this arrangement did not

take place, and no one has seen O'Rouan again.—From the same letter may be seen the confusion which reigned at headquarters, where the Marquis of Campoverde believed that a division of 4,000 English had arrived in the place, and the English Commandant assured me that he had only 1,000 men, who had left Cadiz on the 9th of June. The Marquis also wished that the troops which he demanded of me should be embarked the same night, and he could not but know that this was impossible, for I had no other means but those which the English lent me, and the latter had then none that were disposable.

AMERICAN STATES and ENGLAND.—*Letter of Commodore JOHN ROGERS to the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, relative to a rencontre with the English Ship, LITTLE BELT.—Dated, on board the United States Frigate, the PRESIDENT, off Sandy Hook, 23rd May, 1811.*

Sir; I regret extremely being under the necessity of representing to you an event that occurred on the night of the 16th instant, between the ship under my command, and his Britannic Majesty's ship of war, the Little Belt, commanded by Captain Bingham, the result of which has given me much pain, as well on account of the injury she sustained, as that I should have been compelled to the measure that produced it, by a vessel of her inferior force. The circumstances are as follow: on the 16th instant, at twenty-five minutes past meridian, in 17 fathoms water, Cape Henry bearing S. W. distant fourteen or fifteen leagues, a sail was discovered from our mast head in the east, standing towards us under a press of sail. At half past one the symmetry of her upper sails (which were at this time distinguishable from our deck) and her making signals, shewed her to be a man of war. At 45 minutes past one, P. M. hoisted our ensign and pendant; when, finding her signals not answered, she wore and stood to the southward. Being desirous of speaking her, and of ascertaining what she was, I now made sail in chase; and by half-past three, P. M. found we were coming up with her, as by this time the upper part of her stern began to shew itself above the horizon. The wind now began, and continued gradually to decrease, so as to prevent my being able to approach her sufficiently before sun-set, to discover her actual force, (which we

position she preserved during the chase was calculated to conceal) or to judge even to what nation she belonged, as she appeared studiously to decline shewing her colours. At fifteen or twenty minutes past seven, P. M. the chase took in her studding sails, and soon after hauled up her courses, and hauled by the wind on the starboard tack; she at the same time hoisted an ensign or flag at her mizen peak, but it was too dark for me to discover what nation it represented; now, for the first time, her broadside was presented to our view; but night had so far progressed, that although her appearance indicated she was a frigate, I was unable to determine her actual force.—At fifteen minutes before eight, P. M. being about a mile and a half from her, the wind at the time very light, I directed Capt. Ludlow to take a position to windward of her, and on the same tack, within shore speaking distance. This, however, the commander of the chase appeared from his manœuvres to be anxious to prevent, as he wore and hauled by the wind on different tacks four times successively between this period and the time of our arriving at the position, which I had ordered to be taken. At 15 or 20 minutes past eight, being a little forward of her weather beam, and distant from 70 to 100 yards, I hailed “what ship is that?” To this inquiry no answer was given, but I was hailed by her Commander and asked “what ship is that?”—Having asked the first question, I of course considered myself entitled by the common rules of politeness to the first answer; after a pause of 15 or 20 seconds, I reiterated my first inquiry of “What ship is that?” and before I had time to take the trumpet from my mouth, was answered by a shot, that cut off one of our maintop-mast breast back stays, and went into our main-mast. At this instant Captain Caldwell (of Marines) who was standing very near to me on the gangway, having observed “Sir, she has fired at us,” caused me to pause for a moment; just as I was in the act of giving an order to fire a shot in return, and before I had time to resume the repetition of the intended order, a shot was actually fired from the second division of this ship, and was scarcely out of the gun before it was answered from our assumed enemy by three others in quick succession, and soon

after the rest of his broadside and mucketry. When the first shot was fired, being under an impression that it might possibly have proceeded from accident and without the orders of the Commander, I had determined at the moment to fire only a single shot in return; but the immediate repetition of the previous unprovoked outrage induced me to believe that the insult was premeditated, and that from our adversary being at the time as ignorant of our real force as I was of his, he thought this, perhaps, a favourable opportunity of acquiring promotion, although at the expence of violating our neutrality and insulting our flag; I accordingly with that degree of repugnance incident to feeling equally determined neither to be the aggressor, or to suffer the flag of my country to be insulted with impunity, gave a general order to fire; the effect of which, in from four to six minutes, as near as I can judge, having produced a partial silence of his guns, I gave orders to cease firing, discovering by the feeble opposition that it must be a ship of very inferior force to what I had supposed, or that some untoward accident had happened to her.—My orders in this instance however, although they proceeded alone from motives of humanity and a determination not to spill a drop of blood unnecessarily, I had in less than four minutes some reason to regret, as he renewed his fire, of which two 32-pound shot cut off one of our fore shrouds and injured our foremast. It was now that I found myself under the painful necessity of giving orders for a repetition of our fire against a force which my forbearance alone had enabled to do us any injury of moment; our fire was accordingly renewed and continued from three to five minutes longer, when perceiving our opponent’s gaff and colours down, his maintop-sail yard upon the cap, and his fire silenced, although it was so dark that I could not discern any other particular injury we had done, or how far he was in a situation to do us farther harm, I nevertheless embraced the earliest moment to stop our fire and prevent the further effusion of blood. Here a pause of half a minute or more took place, at the end of which, our adversary not shewing a further disposition to fire, I hailed, and again asked “what ship is that?”

(*To be continued.*)